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Abstract
Being able to compute efficiently a low-weight multiple of a given binary polynomial is
often a key ingredient of correlation attacks to LFSR-based stream ciphers. The best known
general purpose algorithm is based on the generalized birthday problem. We describe an
alternative approach which is based on discrete logarithms and has much lower memory
complexity requirements with a comparable time complexity.
1 Introduction
A Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) is the basic component of many keystream generators
for stream ciphers applications. It is defined by its connection polynomial, which is a binary
polynomial. A parity check for a single LFSR is a multiple of its connection polynomial, while a
parity check for more than one LFSR is a multiple of the least common multiple of the respective
connection polynomials. The weight of a parity check is the weight of the associated polynomial,
that is, the number of its nonzero coefficients.
Correlation attacks were introduced by Siegenthaler in [1] to cryptanalyze a large class of
stream ciphers based on LFSRs. A major improvement by Meier and Staffelbach [2] led to
different versions of fast correlation attacks [3, 4, 5].
These attacks try to find a correlation between the output of the stream cipher and one of
the LFSRs on which it is built, then they try to recover the state of the LFSR by decoding the
keystream as a noisy version of the LFSR output. A fast version of a correlation attack involves
the precomputation of multiple parity checks of one of the LFSRs in order to speed up the com-
putation. This precomputation step can be computed according to two different approaches, one
based on the birthday paradox [6] and another based on discrete logarithms [7]. The determi-
nation of an efficient algorithm for the computation of a polynomial multiple (subject to given
constraints, e.g. on the degree) is an interesting problem in itself for computational algebra.
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It might be argued that the design of modern stream ciphers evolved accordingly. A cipher
like E0 ([8]) is not subject to these types of attacks, since no single LFSR is correlated to the
keystream output. In [9], Lu and Vaudenay introduced a new fast correlation attack which is
able to successfully recover the state of E0. Their attack requires a precomputation step which
computes a single parity check of multiple LFSRs. The complexity of the precomputation step
is not far from the complexity of their full attack, and in order to keep this estimate low, they
employed the generalized birthday approach presented in [10]. Further research was recently
presented in [11], which contains in particular a straightforward generalization of the discrete
logarithm approach of [7].
In this paper we generalize the discrete log approach of [7], proposing an algorithm that is
able to compute a single parity check of multiple LFSRs. To be more precise, the problem we
will address throughout the paper is the following:
Problem 1 FIND A GIVEN-WEIGHT POLYNOMIAL MULTIPLE WITH TARGET DEGREE
Input: A polynomial p and two integers w ≥ 3 and D.
Output: A multiple of p of weight w and degree at most D, if it exists.
In Section 2, we present our strategy, we fix the notation and we give algebraic results on
which the algorithm is based. The algorithm we propose is explained in Section 3, along with
a comparison of its complexity to the generalized birthday approach and to the straightforward
generalization of the discrete log approach for the case of a single primitive polynomial. A
significant example application of our approach is outlined in Subsection 3.3, where we show
that for the fast correlation attack in [9] our algorithm could be more convenient to use in the
second precomputation step than the generalized birthday approach. We draw our conclusions
in Section 4.
2 Our Strategy
In this section we explain our general strategy for the resolution of Problem 1, making reference
to the results reported in Subsection 2.2. We can translate the problem of finding a multiple
of a binary polynomial into finding an appropriate sequence of integers modulo the order of
a polynomial (Propositions 2,3). Next, we show that the general problem is solved once we
know how to solve the problem for single factors of the unique factorization into irreducible
polynomials (Proposition 4). The case of irreducible non-primitive polynomials is reduced to
the case of primitive polynomials, which is solved through discrete logarithms by an explicit
construction which uses Zech’s logaritms (Propositions 5,10,11). Finally, powers of irreducible
polynomials could be completely characterized, although in our algorithm we will aim for a
subset of all possible multiples (Remark 12) for computational reasons.
2.1 Notation
In an Euclidean ring, we denote by a mod c the remainder of the division of a by c. We write
a ≡ b (mod c) if a is congruent to b modulo c. We denote by LCM and GCD the Least Com-
mon Multiple and the Greatest Common Divisor — respectively — of polynomials or integers,
depedending on its inputs.
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Let R=F2[x] be the ring of binary polynomials. A binary polynomial is uniquely determined
by the position of its nonzero coefficients, that is, its support. We denote a binary polynomial by
its exponents:
[e1,e2, . . . ,ek] := x
e1 + xe2 + · · ·+ xek ,
where the ei’s are positive integers. If two integers in the list are repeated we can omit them
from the list and obtain the same binary polynomial. If no integers are repeated then [e1, . . . ,ek]
is a polynomial of weight k. From now on when we say “polynomial” we actually mean “binary
polynomial”.
The remainder of the division of a polynomial by the polynomial 1+ xN is obtained through
reduction modulo N of the exponents:
[e1,e2, . . . ,ek] mod [0,N] = [e¯1, e¯2, . . . , e¯k], (1)
where 0 ≤ e¯i < N and ei ≡ e¯i (mod N).
We will denote by CRT(e(1), . . . ,e(r),N1, . . . ,Nr) the result of applying the Chinese Remain-
der Theorem to integers e(i) and moduli Ni. This is defined if and only if
e(i) ≡ e( j) (mod GCD(Ni,N j))
for all i, j and the result will be the unique 0≤ e¯ < LCM(N1, . . . ,Nr) such that e¯≡ e(i) (mod Ni)
for each i.
2.2 Preliminary Results
Definition 1 (order of a polynomial, [12, Definition 3.2]). Let p be a non-zero polynomial in
F2[x]. If p(0) 6= 0, then the order of p is the least positive integer N such that 1+xN is a multiple
of p, and we denote it by ord(p).
Proposition 2 ([12, Theorem 3.11, Theorem 3.16, Corollary 3.4]). Let p be a binary polynomial
of positive degree and p(0) 6= 0. Let p = pb11 · · · pbrr , where b1, . . . ,br ∈ N and p1, . . . , pr are
distinct irreducible polynomials of degree n1, . . . ,nr, be the factorization of p in F2[x]. Then,
1. ord(p) = 2t LCM(ord(p1), . . . ,ord(pr)) where t is the smallest integer such that 2t is big-
ger or equal than max(b1, . . . ,br);
2. If pi is irreducible, then ord(pi) | 2ni −1;
3. pi is primitive if and only if ord(pi) = 2ni −1.
Proposition 3. Let f , f ′, p be polynomials, f = [e1, . . . ,ek] and f ′ = [e′1, . . . ,e′k] such that for
any i, ei ≡ e′i (mod M), where M is a multiple of ord(p). Then, f is a multiple of p if and only
if f ′ is so.
Proof. Since ei ≡ e′i (mod M), by (1), the remainder of the division of f and f ′ by 1+xM is the
same. Let r be this remainder. So f = q(1+ xM)+ r and f ′ = q′(1+ xM)+ r for some q and q′.
Let us suppose that f is a multiple of p. Since M is a multiple of ord(p), 1+ xM is a multiple of
p. Then r is also a multiple of p, and so f ′ is a multiple of p.
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Proposition 4. Let p = g1 · · ·gr with GCD(gi,g j) = 1 for all i 6= j. We denote Ni = ord(gi) and
N = LCM(N1, . . . ,Nr). Given w− 2 distinct integers 0 < e2 < .. . < ew−1 < N, if there exist r
integers e(1)w , . . .e(r)w with 0 < e(i)w < Ni such that for all i and j
1. [0,e2, . . . ,ew−1,e(i)w ] is a multiple of gi
2. e(i)w ≡ e( j)w (mod GCD(Ni,N j))
then [0,e2, . . . ,ew−1,ew] is a multiple of p of weight w, where
ew = CRT(e(1)w , . . .e(r)w ,N1, . . . ,Nr).
Furthermore, all multiples of p of weight w and degree at most N can be obtained in this
way, that is, if [0,e2, . . . ,ew−1,ew] with 0 < e2 < .. . < ew < N is multiple of p of weight w, then
the integers e(i)w = ew mod Ni satisfy points 1 and 2 above.
Proof. Let j ∈ {1, . . . ,r} and let us prove that [0,e2, . . . ,ew−1,ew] is a multiple of g j. By point
2 we can apply CRT and get an integer ew < N such that ew ≡ e(i)w (mod Ni) for all i. Then, by
point 1, applying Proposition 3 to f = [0,e2, . . . ,ew−1,ew] and f ′ = [0,e2, . . . ,ew−1,e( j)w ], we get
that f is a multiple of g j.
Let [0,e2, . . . ,ew−1,ew] be a multiple of p of weight w of degree at most N, and for i ∈ {1, . . . ,r}
let e(i)w = ew mod Ni. Then, for any i, [0,e2, . . . ,ew−1,ew] is a multiple of gi, and so, by Proposi-
tion 3 the integers e(i)w ’s satisfy point 1. On the other hand, thanks to CRT, since e(i)w = ew mod Ni,
they satisfy also point 2.
Proposition 5 ([12, Lemma 2.12 (ii)]). Let p be an irreducible polynomial and let α be a root
of p in an extension field of F2. Then a polynomial q is a multiple of p if and only if q(α) = 0.
Definition 6 (Discrete Logarithm). Let α ∈ F2n a primitive element and β ∈ F2n ,β 6= 0. We
define the discrete logarithm of β with respect to α as the unique integer 0 ≤ i < 2n such that
α i = β . We use the notation i = DLogα(β ).
Remark 7. Let α be the root of a primitive polynomial p. Given e1, . . . ,ew−1, if we are able to
compute
ew = DLogα(αe1 + . . .+αew−1), (2)
by Proposition 5, we know that [e1, . . . ,ew−1,ew] is a multiple of p. Viceversa, if [e1, . . . ,ew−1,ew]
is a multiple of p, then (2) holds.
In order to give a characterization of the (w−1)-uples of exponents for which the expression
(2) is computable, we introduce Zech’s Logarithms. They can also be used to compute in an
efficient way discrete logarithms (see [13, 14]).
Definition 8 (Zech’s Logarithm). Let p be a primitive polynomial of degree n, α a root of p in
F2n , and N = ord(p). The Zech’s Logarithm with base α of an integer j is the integer 0 < i < N
such that i = DLogα(1+α j) and it will be denoted by i = Zα( j). When j mod N = 0, then
1+α i = 0 and we will say that Zα( j) is not defined.
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Remark 9. The expression (2) can be rewritten in terms of a chain of Zech’s Logarithms in this
way:
αew = αe1 + . . .+αew−1 = αe1(1+αe2−e1(· · · (1+αew−2−ew−3(1+αew−1−ew−2)) · · · ))
ew = e1 +Zα(e2 − e1 +Zα(· · ·Zα(ew−2 − ew−3 +Zα(ew−1− ew−2)) · · · )) (3)
which can also be seen recursively as{
E1 = Zα(ew−1 − ew−2)
Ek+1 = Zα(ew−k−1 − ew−k−2 +Ek)
and we denote the final result ew = e1 +Ew−2 by
Zα(e1,e2, . . . ,ew−1) = DLogα(αe1 + . . .+αew−1).
Note that Zα(e1,e2, . . . ,ew−1) is the concatenation of (w− 2) Zech’s Logarithms. Let us
suppose that Ei is not defined and E1, . . . ,Ei−1 are defined. If i=w−2 (the last Zech’s Logarithm
is undefined) then the discrete logarithm in (2) cannot be computed since there is no integer ew
such that αew = 0. If i < w−2 we have that
ew−i− ew−i−1 +Ei−1 ≡ 0 (mod N)
ew−i−1 ≡ ew−i +Ei−1 (mod N)
αew−i−1 =
i
∑
h=1
αew−h
w−1
∑
h=1
αeh =
w−i−2
∑
h=1
αeh
If i = w−3 the discrete logarithm is computed as ew = e1 mod N. Otherwise, we check whether
we can compute the discrete logarithm Zα(e1, . . . ,ew−i−2) applying the same arguments.
An easy counting argument shows the following:
Proposition 10. Let α be a root of a primitive polynomial p of order N. The set of (w−2)-uples
of integers e2, . . . ,ew−1 such that 0 < e2 < .. . < ew−1 < N has cardinality
(N−1
w−2
)
. Its subset such
that we can compute DLogα(1+αe2 + . . .+αew−1) has cardinality at least
(N−1
w−3
)
(N−2).
Note that for small w and large N,
(N−1
w−2
)
≃ (N − 1)w−2 ≃ Nw−2 and
(N−1
w−3
)
(N − 2) ≃ (N −
1)w−3(N − 2) ≃ Nw−2. Then, for almost all (e2, . . . ,ew−1) we can compute DLogα(1+αe2 +
. . .+αew−1).
Proposition 11. Let p be an irreducible non-primitive polynomial of degree n and order N,
let m = (2n − 1)/N and let α be a primitive root in F2n . Then, f is a multiple of p with
f (0) 6= 0 if and only if there exist integers e1,e2, . . . ,ew−2,ew−1 multiples of m such that 0 <
e1 < e2 < · · · < ew−2 < N, ew−1 = Eα(e1,e2, . . . ,ew−2) with all Zech’s logarithms defined, and
f = [0,d1,d2, . . . ,dw−2,dw−1] with d j = e j/m.
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Proof. Let f = [0,d1,d2, . . . ,dw−2,dw−1] with d1,d2, . . . ,dw−1 as in the statement and let us prove
that f (αm) = 0. Since αm is a root of p, by Proposition 5 this is enough to guarantee that f is a
multiple of p. On the other hand, f (αm) = 1+(αm)d1 +(αm)d2 + . . .+(αm)dw−2 +(αm)dw−1 =
1+αe1 +αe2 + . . .αew−2 +αew−1 = 0. The last equality follows from the hypothesis ew−1 =
Eα(e1,e2, . . . ,ew−2). Vice versa, let f of weight w. Suppose that f = [0,d1,d2, . . . ,dw−2,dw−1]
with 0 < d1 < d2 < · · · < dw−2 < N. If f is a multiple of p, then, by Proposition 5, f (αm) = 0.
From f (αm) = 0, we get that d j = e j/m for all j and ew−1 = Eα(e1,e2, . . . ,ew−2).
Remark 12. If [e1, . . . ,ew] is multiple of p, then [2te1, . . . ,2tew] is multiple of pb for all b ≤ 2t .
In Algorithm 1 we will use Remark 12 to find multiples of powers of irreducibles. Not all
multiples can be found in this way unless the exponent for the repeated factor is a power of two.
In this case a complete characterization of multiples f of power of irreducibles can be given
using the polynomial GCD( f ,D f ). This is not convenient in our case, since GCD( f ,D f ) has
generally a much higher weight than the weight of f .
3 The Algorithm
In this section we propose an algorithm to solve Problem 1 making reference to its pseudocode,
then we estimate its complexity and compare it to other approaches. Finally, we consider the
case of a correlation attack to E0 (Subsection 3.3).
3.1 Description of Algorithm 1
We describe our proposed algorithm making reference to the pseudocode in Algorithm 1.
We take as input the factorization of the polynomial p:
p = pb11 · . . . · p
br
r ,
where p1, . . . , pr are irreducible polynomials and b1, . . . ,br positive integers. Computing the
factorization is not computationally expensive, it can be efficiently computed using a probabilis-
tic algorithm such as the Cantor-Zassenhaus algorithm (cfr [12]) and in some cases, such as in
correlation attacks to LFSR-based stream ciphers, the polynomial we are interested in is given
already by its irreducible factors.
We start (line 2) by computing a root αmii for each irreducible polynomial pi, expressed as
a power of a primitive root αi of F2deg(pi) (if the polynomial is primitive mi = 1). Next (line 3)
we compute the order of each root αmii , we set m as the least common multiple of all mi (line 4),
and we set t as an integer (line 5) that will allow us to take into account powers of irreducible
polynomials (in line 12 we will output the multiple of p as a multiple of p1 · . . . · pr elevated to
2t/m).
The main cycle samples w− 2 distinct integers less than m ·D/2t (line 7), then computes
for each i their remainders modulo Ni and discards pairs of equal elements (line 8). The most
demanding computation is done on line 9 where we compute the chain of Zech’s logarithms as
described in Remark 9. If we are not able to perform this computation or one of the ei,w’s is not a
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Algorithm 1 Given the factorization of a polynomial p, w and D, the algorithm finds (if it exists)
a multiple of p of weight w and degree at most D.
1: function (p1, . . . , pr,b1, . . . ,br,w,D)
⊲ All lines with i repeat for i = 1, . . . ,r
2: αi,mi ← PrimitiveRoot(pi)
⊲ If pi is primitive then mi = 1
⊲ If pi is irreducible not primitive then αmii is a root of pi
3: Ni ← (2deg(pi)−1)/mi
⊲ Ni is the order of αmii
4: m ← LCM(m1, . . . ,mr)
5: t ← MinIntegerGreaterOrEqualThan(log2 b1, . . . , log2 br)
6: repeat
7: e2, . . . ,ew−1 ← RandomDistinctMultiplesLessThan(m ·D/2t)
⊲ Random sampling of (w−2) distinct integers ≤ D
⊲ which are multiples of m
8: ei,2, . . . ,ei,k(i) ← ReduceAndShorten(e2, . . . ,ew−1,Ni)
⊲ Reduce modulo Ni and eliminate pairs of equal integers
⊲ we might obtain a shorter sequence of integers (k(i)≤ w−1)
9: ei,w ← Zαi(0,ei,2, . . . ,ei,k(i))
⊲ If not possible, restart the cycle
⊲ also, restart the cycle if ei,w mod mi 6= 0
10: ew ← CRT(e1,w, . . . ,er,w,N1, . . . ,Nr)
⊲ If not possible, restart the cycle
11: until 2tew/m ≤ D
12: return [0,2t e2/m, . . . ,2tew/m]
13: end function
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multiple of mi, then we restart the cycle. Otherwise, we try to compute the exponent ew through
the Chinese Remainder Theorem (line 10) given the exponents computed at previous step. If all
Ni’s are coprime we are sure to be able to perform this step, otherwise it might happen that a
couple (ei,w,e j,w) is not congruent modulo GCD(Ni,N j). In this case we restart the cycle. We
remark that in the case of Ni not all coprimes it may happen that we are never able to compute
this CRT. We will comment on this aspect in 3.1.1. The exit condition for the cycle (line 11) is
verified if we have found a multiple of p1 · . . . · pr with degree at most m ·D/2t , from which we
are easily able (line 12) to produce a multiple of p of degree at most D (which will have weight
w by construction). The correctness of Algorithm 1 follows from the results cited in Section 2.
3.1.1 The case of Nis not all coprimes
Suppose p is the product of p1, p2 with N1 = ord(p1),N2 = ord(p2) and that GCD(N1,N2) is not
1. In this case it may happen that we are never able to compute CRT(e1,w,e2,w,N1,N2), that is, all
possible pairs (e1,w,e2,w) are not congruent modulo GCD(N1,N2). Using bounds on the minimal
distance of cyclic codes coming from coding theory (see [15, Vol 1, p.60 and following]), one
can verify whether or not the CRT can be computed. If the minimal distance of the cyclic code
generated by p is ≥ w0, then obviously the CRT cannot be computed for all w < w0.
3.2 Complexity estimates
The complexity of Algorithm 1 is estimated in terms of the order of polynomial N and target
degree D under an appropriate Statistical Assumption (Subsection 3.2.1). Then (Subsection
3.2.2), we compare it to the complexity of birthday-based approaches expressing our estimates
in terms of the complexity parameter n, the degree of p.
3.2.1 Complexity of Algorithm 1
We set n, the degree of polynomial p, to be our complexity parameter. Clearly, the main com-
putational cost in the cycle is the r computations of the chain of (w−2) Zech’s logarithms (line
8). We denote the cost of the Zech’s logarithm as a cost C(n). Since we compute r chains of
w−2 Zech’s logarithms, in each cycle we have a complexity of O(r(w−2)C(n)). Observe that
C(n) depends on n via dependence on the degrees δi = deg(pi). Among the δi’s there is one,
which we may call ∆, such that 2∆ −1 has the biggest factor among the 2δi −1. Evidently, C(n)
is dominated by the cost of computing the discrete logarithm in the field F2∆ . We remark that
the cost of computing discrete logarithms in fields of small characteristics has recently dropped
down to quasi-polynomial complexity (see [16]). We are left to estimate the number of cycles.
To estimate the number of cycles which Algorithm 1 needs to go through before stopping,
we make the following
Statistical Assumption 1. All chains of Zech’s Logarithm computation Zα with random input
produce an output which is uniformly random distributed over {1,2, . . . ,M−1}, where M is the
order of α . We assume also that for α 6= β the outputs of Zα and Zβ are independent random
variables.
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Although the Statistical Assumption 1 is reasonable (and experimentally verifiable), there is
an unfortunate case when there is a pair (i, j) where GCD(Ni,N j) 6= 1 and there exist no multiple
of pi · p j of weight w (see discussion in Subsection 3.1.1).
Under this assumption, we can compute the ei,w’s once every mi cycles (i.e. always if mi = 1).
Furthermore, the ei,w’s are uniformly distributed over {1,2, . . . ,Ni − 1} and so, by the Chinese
Remainder Theorem, ew can be computed with a probability P where
P ≤ Π(i, j),i6= j
1
GCD(Ni,N j)
,
and it will be uniformly distibuted over {1,2, . . . ,N−1}, where N := LCM({Ni}i=1,...,r).
The condition that 2tew ≤ mM is thus verified after a number of cycles estimated as
O
(
1
P
Πimi ·2tN/(m ·D)
)
and the full time complexity of Algorithm 1 is hence
O
(
r(w−2)(1+C(n)) 1
P
Πimi ·
2tN
m ·D
)
. (4)
We note that can consider P as constant with respect to n, while N can be approximated by
2n. In the next subsubsection we will express D as a function of n and compare estimate (4) with
the complexity of birthday-based approaches.
3.2.2 Comparison with other approaches
Birthday-based approaches compute their complexities under a different statistical assumption:
Statistical Assumption 2. The multiples of degree at most D of a polynomial of degree n has
weight w with probability circa
( D
w−1
)
2−D.
Using this assumption, one can prove ([17]) that the expected number of the polynomials
multiples of weight w for large D is:
Nn,w ≃
( D
w−1
)
2n
≃
Dw−1
(w−1)!2n
(5)
Using (5) one computes the (expected) critical degree where polynomials of degree w will start
to appear as
D0 ≃ (w−1)!
1
w−1 ·2
n
w−1 (6)
A method based on the birthday paradox ([2]) finds a multiple of weight w and minimal
degree D0 with time complexity
O(D⌈
w−1
2 ⌉
0 ), (7)
and memory complexity
O(D⌊
w−1
2 ⌋
0 ). (8)
9
Birthday Generalized Birthday Algorithm 1
w 3 4 5 3 4 5 3 4 4 5 5
D 2n/2 2n/3 2n/4 2n/2 2n/2 2n/3 2n/2 2n/2 2n/3 2n/3 2n/4
time 2n/2 22n/3 2n/2 2n/2 2n/2 2n/3 2n/2 2n/2 22n/3 22n/3 23n/4
memory 2n/2 22n/3 2n/2 2n/2 2n/2 2n/3 1 1 1 1 1
Table 1: Comparing complexity of Algorithms. We compare only the part of complexity which
is exponential in the degree of the polynomial of which we want to find the multiple. Algorithm
1 performs better for weigth 3 and for weight 4.
Using generalized birthday problem ([10]) one aims at finding a multiple of same weight but
higher degree (D1 ≃ 2
n
1+⌊log(w−1)⌋ ) in less time. The time complexity for this approach is
O((w−1) ·D1) (9)
while memory complexity is O(D1).
In Table 1 we summarize the comparison of our discrete log approach with birthday based
approaches. Birthday based approaches do not distinguish the polynomial p in terms of its
factorization while Algorithm 1 does, so for our comparison we assumed to be in the situation
of p a multiple of primitive polynomials whose degrees are coprime. To simplify we also kept
out the constant terms and we compare only the part of complexity which depends strictly on
n. We set as D for comparison the D0 and D1 which are defined — respectively — by birthday
and generalized birthday approaches. We can see that Algorithm 1 performs better (same time
complexity but much better memory complexity) than both birthday based approaches in the case
of weights w = 3,4 and it performs worse than both of them w = 5 (higher time complexity). We
remark that this comparison does not take into account the computation constant term given by
computation of discrete logarithms. When it comes to practical implementation of the method
this constant term might slow down too much Algorithm 1. A possible solution could be to
precompute discrete logarithms. This would imply an increased memory complexity of the
order of 2q −1 where q is the biggest prime factor in the degrees of the polynomials p1, . . . , pr.
Previous discrete log based approaches were limited to p being a single primitive polynomial
and cannot be extended straightforwardly to the case of general p.
In [18], Penzhorn and Kuhn used a different statistical assumption on the output of Zech’s
Logarithms. They assumed that the difference of two Zech’s Logarithms over {1,2, . . . ,N −1}
has exponential distribution of parameter D/N when both inputs are randomly distributed over
{1,2, . . . ,D− 1}. This is applied only for the case w = 4 and gives an algorithm which is able
to compute a multiple of degree 2n/3 with time complexity 2n/3 outperforming all approaches
mentioned above.
In [7], Didier and Laigle-Chapuy used a discrete logarithm approach with time memory trade
off to compute a polynomial multiple of degree D in time complexity O(D⌈ w−22 ⌉) and memory
complexity O(D⌊ w−22 ⌋).
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3.3 Example case: E0
In [9], Lu and Vaudenay describe a correlation attack to E0, the stream cipher of the Bluetooth
protocol ([8]). E0 is a nonlinear combination generator with memory and it is based on four
LFSRs of degrees 25,31,33,39 with the following feedback polynomials:
p1 = x25 + x20 + x12 + x8 +1 (10)
p2 = x31 + x24 + x16 + x12 +1 (11)
p3 = x33 + x28 + x24 + x4 +1 (12)
p4 = x39 + x36 + x28 + x4 +1 (13)
In the key-recovery attack of [9], two precomputation steps require to compute a weight-5 mul-
tiple of p2 · p3 · p4 of degree at most 234.3 using generalized birthday approach, and a weight-3
multiple of p3 · p4 of degree at most 236 using a standard birthday approach. To find the first
multiple precomputation, Algorithm 1 would be inconvenient since it would require a higher
time complexity. For the second multiple precomputation, Algorithm 1 could be useful since it
requires approximately the same time complexity while having a much lower memory complex-
ity. We remark that in [9] the memory complexity for the precomputation part is not explicitly
stated.
Note also that all pi’s are primitive and that GCD(N3,N4) = 23 − 1 = 7 6= 1. We are in the
case where some of the Ni’s are not coprime and for this specific polynomials, it is experimen-
tally verified that the CRT can be computed roughly once every seven times.
4 Conclusions
The algorithm presented in this paper is the first able to solve Problem 1 in a general situation,
taking advantage of the polynomial factorization. Its complexity should be compared to that
of other general purpose algorithms, in particolar with those based on the (general) birthday
approach. We have been able to show that in some interesting cases our algorithm has a time
complexity comparable to the generalized birthday approach, while having a much lower mem-
ory complexity (i.e. O(1)). These cases are relevant to the so-called faster correlation attacks to
a class of stream ciphers, which including the Bluetooth cipher E0.
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